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Abstract: Regulation is often mentioned as a barrier to technology innovation in various industries. Delayed market entry, stifled creativity, added 
activities and resource requirements are some frequently mentioned barriers. The study presented here explored various claims of regulation acting 
as a barrier to technology innovation. The findings suggest that formal statutory requirements only partly explain why regulation is perceived as a 
technology innovation barrier. Findings further indicate several discrepancies between stated and formal regulatory barriers and suggest that the 
majority of the stated barriers emerge within the organization during operationalization and the technology innovation process.
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Introduction
Many firms conduct their technology innovation activities in a reg-
ulatory environment affected by various rules and directives main-
tained and upheld by an authority. The impact of these regulations on 
a firm’s technology innovation activities can be both positive as well 
as negative depending on various industry and firm characteristics 
(Dodgson, Gann, & Salter, 2008), as well as technological characteris-
tics (Ashford & Heaton, 1983).
Although clear that regulation can negatively impact technology in-
novation in a wide range of industries (Rothwell, 1980; Ashford & 
Heaton, 1983), the reason why it does so is less clear. Findings suggest 
that the negative impact on technology innovation is most noticeable 
in industries with standards for minimum quality, safety, and efficacy 
(Maxwell, 1998; Hall & Bagchi-Sen, 2002), especially when regula-
tion is too rigidly imposed or administratively complicated (Pearce 
& Turner, 1984), or when it limits and encumbers technology related 
activities and outcomes (Garud & Rappa, 1994).
However, findings showing that regulation stifles technology innova-
tion often relies on perceptual measures (e.g. Hauptman & Roberts, 
1987). Little concrete evidence exists in support of the widespread 
perception within certain industries that regulation negatively im-
pacts technology innovation (Ashford & Heaton, 1983). Further-
more, a closer examination of the perceptual measures reveal that 
statements of regulation as a barrier to technology innovation tends 
to diminish over time within individual firms (Hauptman & Roberts, 
1987). Increasingly, investigations have suggested that regulation in 
itself does not stifle technology innovation, but rather attempts of its 
operationalization (Ashford & Heaton, 1983; Georg, Røpke, & Jør-
gensen, 1992; Hadjimanolis, 2003; Herzlinger, 2006).
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To this background, the study presented in this paper investigates 
how well stated regulatory barriers coincide with formal regulatory 
requirements during the technology development process. Of prin-
cipal interest is to increase our understanding of underlying causes 
regarding possible discrepancies. Relying on an insider-outsider re-
search approach (see Louis & Bartunek, 1992) we conducted an in-
depth case study at a large multinational medical device company. 
Our case is suitable for four reasons. First, the medical device indus-
try is characteristic of an industry where regulation is often reported 
as a key barrier to technology innovation (Eisenberg, 2007; Kaplan 
et al., 2004). Second, the case is situated in a low-velocity industry 
environment thus mitigating the risk of regulatory barriers stemming 
from outdated regulations. Third, the case company was recently sub-
jected to regulatory inspection and risked restrictions on key mar-
kets. Finally, one of the authors has worked with technology innova-
tion within the case company since 2006.
Method
Our investigation is based on desk research, interviews, and an in-depth 
case study. One author (hereafter called the insider) has nine years of 
experience in various roles related to technology development and 
quality management at the case company, a multinational with USD 
3.2 billion in turnover and nearly 16,000 employees in 2015 (upon re-
quest, all information pertaining to the company is made anonymous).
The insider’s vocational experiences include but are not limited to: the 
development of a new quality system, participation in several technol-
ogy innovation projects, as well as involvement in several regulatory 
audits conducted at the case company. This ensured contextual knowl-
edge related to the handling, understanding, and operationalization of 
regulatory frameworks deemed necessary for the aim of this study. 
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This research study was conducted in three stages. During the first, 
the insider and outsider met to discuss the ongoing regulatory inspec-
tions. The insider argued that whilst regulation is perceived as a barri-
er to technology innovation within the case company, the actual cause 
was unclear. To address this gap, the insider set out to conduct desk 
research centered on regulation as a barrier to technology innovation. 
The desk research included both academic articles on technology in-
novation in regulatory environments as well as the regulatory frame-
work in question, i.e. the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
Insights from literature formed the basis for further investigations by 
providing a framework over various reasons that regulation inhibits 
technology innovation. Various operational limitations and resource 
demands are examples of these ‘inhibitors’. 
The second stage involved interviews. We selected the following 
representatives from functional areas associated with technology in-
novation and regulation: 1) R&D manager, 2) technical manager, 3) 
site manager, 4) regulatory and quality assurance manager, 5) proj-
ect manager, 6) three new product development (NPD) engineers, 7) 
and a former FDA inspector. These interviews were transcribed and 
analyzed to identify statements related to regulation inhibiting tech-
nology innovation. Statements were initially identified in terms of 
impacting the outcome or the process of technology innovation, and 
then grouped into categories that we coded based on the statements. 
For example, a statement regarding submittal time would be coded 
under ‘time to market’. Statements could include examples of impact 
and individual opinions and beliefs about their own work and the 
work of others. The aim was not to collect evidence for the inhibitors 
found during the previous desk research stage, but to collect data on 
the various ways individuals reported regulation as a barrier.
Finally, we compared and contrasted the findings from the two previ-
ous stages by sorting the ways regulation reportedly inhibited tech-
nical innovation, i.e. stated barriers, as well as assess the degree of 
concrete mention in regulatory text, i.e. regulatory requirements. We 
relied on the stage gate model of technology innovation to guide us in 
this effort to compare stated and concrete examples of formal regula-
tory requirements.
Regulation and the technology innovation process
According to the 2003 PDMA study, firms increasingly rely on for-
mal product development processes (Barczak, Griffin, & Kahn, 2009). 
One commonly used method is to treat technology development as 
occurring in several stages. The exact nature of what these stages 
looks like is industry and firm specific, but generally they include: 
discovery, scoping, build business case, development, testing and val-
idation, followed by launch and post-launch review (Cooper, 2008; 
Cooper, Edgett, & Kleinschmidt, 2002).
In industries where regulation has a high impact on technology devel-
opment, e.g. the clean technology industry (Pearce & Turner, 1984), 
the chemical industry (Ashford & Heaton, 1983), and the medical de-
vices industry (Eisenberg, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2004), these stages and 
gates consider regulation to a higher degree (for an example see Pi-
etzsch, Shluzas, Paté-Cornell, Yock, & Linehan, 2009). For industries 
sharing a focus on minimum quality standards, safety and efficacy, 
the regulatory barriers are quite similar. Minimum quality standards 
are enforced through quality management systems and/or directly on 
products, and necessitate steps for how to establish evidence of safety, 
efficacy and quality controls during the product lifecycle. 
Regulation can thus directly limit technology innovation outcomes as 
well as the processes involved in providing evidence of safety and ef-
ficacy claims. These processes are often both costly and time consum-
ing and increase risks associated with technology innovation (Kaplan 
et al., 2004). Similarly, regulatory compliance often requires manu-
facturers and developers to ensure that the manufacturing outputs in 
question, as well as associated activities, are compliant with statutes. 
Furthermore, given the vast amount of manufacturing outputs cov-
ered by regulatory frameworks, manufacturers often have problems 
navigating the regulatory text. Also, the applicability of a statute nor-
mally varies throughout the technology innovation process. In order 
to facilitate further reading, we now present the case-specific context 
of medical devices development.
Medical devices that are marketed in the U.S. are regulated by the 
FDA. In the case of the FDA, quality standards, safety, and efficacy are 
ensured through four main statutes: 1) Premarket Notification, other-
wise known as the 510(k), 2) Premarket Approval (PMA), 3) Investi-
gational Device Exemption (IDE), and 4) Quality System Regulation 
(QSR). The 510(k) and the PMA achieve their purpose of ensuring 
product safety and efficacy by requiring medical device manufactur-
ers to demonstrate that a new device is substantially equivalent to an 
already approved device, or by using for instance clinical studies to 
demonstrate that the new device is safe and effective for intended use. 
Finally, the QSR dictates requirements on the quality management 
system (QMS) that requires various organizational activities, such as 
documentation, as well as by provides specifications for technology 
innovation activities and outcomes. The relevance of a certain statute 
depends on two things: 1) the risk classification of the medical device 
(ranging from 1-4 on major markets) where larger numbers signify 
greater risk, and correspondingly more rigorous regulatory require-
ments, and 2) the stage of the medical device development process.
To this background, we will adopt the adaptation of Pietzsch et al. 
(2009) of the stage-gate process consisting of five major stages: I) ini-
tiation, opportunity, and risk analysis, II) formulation, concept, and 
feasibility, III) design and development, and verification and valida-
tion, IV) final validation and launch preparation, and V) launch and 
post-launch assessment. Given that Stage III contains regulatory sub-
mission, we omit the last two stages given that the majority of tech-
nology development takes place in the first three. In the next section, 
we present our case findings.
86
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://jotmi.org)
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2015. Volume 10, Issue 3
Case findings
Below we account for our case findings by describing each of the three 
stages in terms of their formal regulatory requirements as well as the 
stated barriers.
Stage I and regulatory requirements
Stage I involves activities focused on user need identification and idea 
screening activities such as intellectual property (IP) reviews, prelim-
inary market analysis, and estimations of clinical impact. To ensure 
efficacy, needs need to be verified. Such a verification process may 
involve talking to physicians, patients and technology users, as well 
as direct observation in clinical settings. Stage I also involves a review 
of existing solutions as well as continued activities aimed at market 
assessment. Finally, Stage I contains initial assessments of technol-
ogy risks as well as potential regulatory paths. Formally, he FDA does 
not impact any of the activities in Stage I, but later regulatory steps 
depend on applicants being able to show documentation of need veri-
fication and risk assessment (see Stage II). 
Stage I and stated barriers
Stage I mostly lacks formal regulatory requirements. However, a qual-
ity and regulatory assurance manager told us that “people complain 
about for instance design control limiting their work during phases 
when it does not even apply”. Similarly, a former FDA inspector told 
us that “much of the impact is due to work being done that the FDA 
does not specifically require”. One example of such unnecessary work 
is found during the early product concept development. NPD engi-
neers were complaining that “the design control limits early creativ-
ity” in terms of product design. Formally, design control starts with 
Stage II. 
The only formal requirement impacting Stage I is associated with 
documentation of need verification and risk assessment. The FDA 
does not specify steps for conducting such a need verification and risk 
assessment. Instead, companies rely on tools such as quality function 
deployment to map customer expectations and needs into processes 
and parameters that will fulfill them, and basic failure effect mode 
analysis to assess the risk of product concepts. 
Finally, firms normally consider the radicalness of the proposed tech-
nology and the preferred market entry model during Stage I. Depend-
ing on a company’s R&D strategy and product portfolio, developers 
focus on certain risk classes when developing medical devices. Such 
a focus was mentioned by the R&D manager to be “a barrier to more 
radical innovation”. But the statutes do not limit a company’s develop-
ment efforts per se, but rather detail what the regulatory process looks 
like leading to approval. The choice of preferred class is determined 
by various functional strategies.
Stage II and regulatory requirements
Stage II includes development activities that start once the develop-
ment project is approved. The main focus is on concept formulation 
and feasibility assessment. These activities are the first to be subject 
to regulation in the form of design controls and are formally regu-
lated by 21 CFR 820.30. One specific requirement is the creation and 
maintenance of a design history file (DHF) indicating that the device 
is developed in accordance to a previously approved design plan. One 
important step is to document user inputs that impact design choices. 
Common sources for such input are existing product complaints or 
meetings with potential end users such as doctors, technicians and 
nurses. Furthermore, user input can also include information related 
to the intended use, testing requirements, biocompatibility require-
ments, and requirements related to the physical aspects of the final 
device. The purpose is to verify user needs as inputs to the design 
process and to ensure that these are secured by design choices.
As with most technology development, medical devices development 
is marked by iterations and frequent changes. Computational models 
(such as finite element analysis), although not formally required, are 
often used in this development stage to ensure that verified needs are 
met and that risks are controlled. Formally, the FDA requires that the 
DHF is maintained to ensure that such changes do not compromise 
the ability to satisfy an identified need, or affect the risk of the product. 
In addition, the FDA requires continuous design reviews throughout 
the design process. Finally, the FDA requires a risk analysis where 
risks are identified and mitigated to the level that corresponds or im-
proves upon existing products used for the same purpose.
In sum, Stage II marks the beginning of formal requirements. Al-
though requirements, such as risk analysis, are not specified in terms 
of process steps, there exist industry standards for how such a risk 
analysis should be conducted (e.g. ISO 14971). Several tools, such as 
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
are commonly adopted to conduct and manage risk analysis during 
Stage II. 
Stage II and stated barriers
Our findings suggest that this stage is perceived to be quite problematic. 
Issues related to encumbering activities, bothersome quality systems, 
and limitations to product designs were examples mentioned. We will 
now elaborate on each.
As for encumbering activities, NPD engineers reported that the doc-
umentation associated with Stage II is cumbersome and ties up im-
portant resources from other value-adding tasks. One NPD engineer 
reported that “the documentation has been drafted from scratch three 
times” when referring to documentation during early design related 
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activities. Another stated that “we spend a lot of time documenting 
why we did not have time to do things. Ironically, we did not have the 
time to do them because we were documenting”. Similar sentiments 
were expressed by others as well and it was not only the rework that 
was seen as problematic, but also the amount of work done. 
However, the FDA does not specify documentation amount or pro-
cedures. Both the former FDA inspector and a regulatory and quali-
ty assurance manager argued that rework can be avoided by doing 
things correctly from the start and that the need for such rework 
and amounts of documentation stemmed from a lack of regulatory 
knowledge and not from any statute. In fact, the guidelines and pro-
cedures for documentation are directly governed by the organization’s 
quality system and not the FDA, thus suggesting that regulatory bar-
riers might emerge during the translation of FDA requirements into 
the QMS. 
As for statements related to a bothersome QMS, NPD engineers re-
ported that “the quality system is in the way of NPD”. Much of this 
relates to the various encumbering activities mentioned above. How-
ever, when asked about this statement, the project manager argued 
that “the problem is that many people working here do not really 
understand what the regulations are for and they only see it as a big 
problem”. The former FDA inspector added that “people in R&D do 
not understand the regulation [and] are reluctant to have controls en-
forced upon them”. Both suggest that such a lack of knowledge may 
further lead to a negative attitude towards regulation.
However, whilst such a lack of knowledge may explain the NPD en-
gineers needing to redraft documents based on an existing QMS pro-
cedure, it does not adequately explain why the QMS itself changed 
during the medical device development process. When asked about 
the three redrafts as mentioned by the NPD engineer, the regulatory 
and quality assurance manager stated that “of course we change our 
processes and templates if something is not working, it is a contin-
uous quest of improvement” and more generally that “we try to de-
velop foolproof procedures and templates, but we are always lagging 
behind the projects”. Such statements suggest that the barrier may not 
solely reside in the lack of regulatory knowledge among NPD engi-
neers, but also in a lack of knowledge around the NPD process among 
regulatory and quality function staff.
Finally, issues were also mentioned in relation to product design lim-
itations. The choice of preferred regulatory pathway limits product 
development outputs to certain classes of medical devices. During 
one product development meeting, a number of technical alterations 
were suggested in order to improve the product. The technical man-
ager responded that “those alterations should be avoided since they 
may have an impact on the intended use, and then we need to submit 
a new 510(k)”. However, no further inquiry was conducted to investi-
gate whether or not the alterations would, in fact, impact on intended 
use or if they would require a new 510(k) submittal. The insider ar-
gues that similar cases are common and that there is a tendency to try 
to stay on the safe side, thus exacerbating any regulatory barrier that 
may actually exist. 
Stage III and regulatory requirements
Stage III starts after the formulation of a product concept and sev-
eral rounds of prototyping. Activities during this stage are aimed at 
design and development, and verification and validation. The FDA 
requires documentation of all verification and validation activities 
to the extent that they are reproducible. Design verification involves 
activities that ensure that design outputs satisfy design inputs, that 
it is compliant with the QMS, and that it is suitable given associated 
activities such as packaging, shipping, cleaning etc. Design valida-
tion activities aim to ensure that user needs are met. These activities 
include use tests and the investigation of human factors and user 
interfaces to assess potential issues that arise during everyday usage. 
Finally, design control deliverables, such as product FMEA is up-
dated during Stage III, as is the addition of process FMEA to satisfy 
QSR requirements of Good Manufacturing Practices. Stage III, and 
our study, ends with a decision to no longer alter the product design 
prior to launch, and a submission of test and design data to the FDA 
for regulatory approval.
Stage III and stated barriers
Based on statutes, Stage III requirements are rather similar to the 
Stage II ones. One additional concrete barrier is the submittal time. 
However, the R&D manager stated that “submittal processing time is 
a well-known fact and easy to plan around” suggesting that it may not 
be perceived as a substantial barrier. However, the amount of docu-
mentation needed for the DHF is considered more problematic. One 
NPD engineer pointed at two shelves of binders and told us “look at 
that, that is for one project”. Furthermore, as argued by both the NPD 
engineer as well as the project manager, the provided resources are 
not enough to match the additional demands from such activities. 
However, the site manager stated that “it cannot be required by a 
sound quality system to generate this amount of documentation 
when developing these products”. The FDA itself does not specify the 
amount of documentation; rather it is during the establishment of the 
QMS that the specifications and routines for documentation are de-
veloped. In the following section, we synthesize our findings of stated 
and formal regulatory demands.
Discussion
In Figure 1, we present our adaptation of the stage-gate (see Cooper, Edgett, & Kleinschmidt, 2002) model of technology innovation to more 
specifically focus on regulation as a barrier. The model shows how product development, formal regulatory requirements, and stated regulatory 
barriers unfold over the tree stages included in our study.
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Although differences are expected to exist between different tech-
nology types, we argue that our findings are generally applicable to 
a variety of industries where regulation is perceived as a barrier to 
technology innovation. Our findings are not meant to generalize the 
regulatory barriers themselves, but rather to examine why regulation 
is perceived as a barrier, and to what extent the stated barriers corre-
spond with formal regulatory requirements. As such, we believe that 
insights of this kind are more broadly applicable to a wide range of 
industries where regulation aims to ensure safety, quality and efficacy 
of technology innovation outputs. 
Our findings regarding barriers can be divided into three categories 
based on requirement source:
1. Formal requirement: the majority of stated barriers did not 
correspond to formal regulatory requirements. The only one 
we identified was the submittal processing time, which was 
mentioned as “a well-known fact and easy to plan around”. 
Figure 1. An overview of product development activities, formal regulatory requirements, and stated barriers.
2. Derived requirement: several stated barriers may be derived 
from formal regulatory requirements. These are: documentation 
amount, substantial equivalence limits design choices, and 
difficulties with the QMS.
3. No requirement: the majority of stated barriers could not be 
linked to any formal regulatory requirement. These stated 
barrier include: redrafting documents, design controls limiting 
early creativity, lack of understanding and knowledge, that the 
QMS and regulatory experts are in the way of NPD, people in 
R&D actively rejecting rule bound work environments, and that 
regulation necessitates unnecessary rework. 
In addition, our findings can also be grouped into four categories 
based on the underlying cause of the stated barrier (Table 1): a) im-
pacting activities, b) limiting design choices, c) knowledge require-
ments, and d) role assumptions and attitudes. Whilst it is possible to 
argue for overlaps, we treat them as separate for the sake of parsimony.
SOURCE OF REQUIREMENT
Cause Formal Derived None
Impacting activities Submittal processing time Documentation amount. Redrafting documents.
Limiting design 
choices Substantial equivalence limits design choices. Design control limits early creativity.
Knowledge 
requirements Difficulties with the QSR.




The quality system is in the way.
People in R&D are reluctant to be bound by rules.
Regulation necessitates unnecessary rework.
Regulatory experts only want to slow down R&D.
Table 1. Overview of stated barriers and their underlying causes.
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So, what can managers do? Below we will provide recommendations 
based on the underlying cause as well as the specific stage of the de-
velopment process.
The first, impacting activities, mainly impacts Stage II and III. In order 
to overcome stated barriers of this type, we provide the following advice:
•	 Project evaluations. Solely relying on cost and timing metrics 
is not enough. Instead, continuous evaluations should be per-
formed of regulatory compliance status using internal audits 
and assessments of project documentation. Resulting feedback 
should be presented to all those involved in the development 
project. This way, an early lack of documentation, e.g. need ver-
ification, may be addressed timely and without incurring addi-
tional costs further down the process.
•	 Underperforming projects. Remedial actions should always 
consider regulatory consequences. Whilst it may be tempting to 
let projects pass a decision point without adequate regulatory 
groundwork, things may eventually get out of order.
•	 Prevention and planning. Ensure that applicable QMS proce-
dures as well as the design plan are compliant with regulations 
whilst remaining as lean as possible before moving into Stage III. 
To achieve this, the various functional representatives all need to 
understand and accept the QMS and the design plan. If they do 
not, it is a sign to be taken seriously. Finally, it is important that 
the development team continuously revisits design plans and 
relevant QMS procedures during development.
The second, limiting design choices, mainly impacts Stage I and II. 
In order to overcome stated barriers of this type, we provide the 
following advice:
•	 Do not constrain idea generation too early. Early on, it is import-
ant to encourage conceptual and creative thinking. In order to 
allow for such thinking, and to avoid limiting design choices ear-
ly on, developers should decide on the regulatory path towards 
the end of Stage I. On a related note, it is equally important that 
once limitations are imposed, they fall within the regulatory 
pathway without being over-engineered.
The third, knowledge requirements, seems to impact all stages. In order 
to overcome stated barriers of this type, we provide the following advice:
•	 Training and development. Employees must have sufficient un-
derstanding of regulations in order to perform their work. This 
applies to both development-oriented staff in terms of regula-
tory compliance, as well as for regulatory and quality assurance 
staff in terms of technology innovation processes. The aim is 
to detail procedures that comply with regulations, whilst at the 
same time being as lean as possible. The use of cross-functional 
teams is particularly encouraged. Regulatory requirements may 
then hopefully be viewed as common sense practices rather than 
encumbering activities.
•	 Know the boundaries. Regulatory compliance should not be 
encumbered and complicated through stricter than necessary 
control practices. This is especially important during the devel-
opment and implementation of the QMS.
The fourth and final, role assumptions and attitudes, seems to impact 
all stages. In order to overcome stated barriers of this type, we provide 
the following advice:
•	 Promote a quality culture. Senior management needs to promote a 
quality culture where employees can embrace regulation as a means 
to ensure safe and high-quality products. This involves for instance 
setting up a suitable forum for quality concerns to be voiced where 
employees can speak out freely. It also involves letting everyone 
know that quality is key and aligning incentives accordingly.
•	 Cross-functional teams. Including regulatory and quality assurance 
staff in development teams from the start facilitates compliance and 
turns regulatory and quality assurance into a supporting partner 
rather than a final approving body. This promotes the aforemen-
tioned quality culture and ensures that regulatory compliance is 
seen as supportive for good work practices rather than as a barrier.
•	 Shared assumptions. Be vary of shared assumptions that emerge 
during early periods when knowledge is low. Various function-
al representatives will develop shared assumptions about the 
QMS and regulation in general. These shared assumptions may 
surface as taken for granted truths about for instance degree of 
documentation, that rework is a natural part of the process, or 
how evaluation systems look like. Unless dealt with, these shared 
assumptions may potentially underlie many of stated barriers.
Given the limitations of single case studies, the degree to which the 
above-stated recommendations are generally applicable may vary. 
However, on a general level, we urge managers to become more aware 
of the perceived nature of regulation as a barrier to innovation. Fur-
thermore, in light of our findings we argue that the impact of regu-
lation on innovation may also be determined by the extent to which 
the regulatory guidelines are general or specific. Our findings suggest 
that when the aim is to provide a general framework, as in the case of 
FDA, then barriers may be constructed during the translation of such 
a general framework into firm-specific activities.
Conclusions
The perception that regulation is a barrier to technology innovation 
is widespread in some industries. In order to stay competitive, firms 
operating in such industries must overcome the barriers associated 
with regulation. By investigating an organization recently subject to a 
regulatory inspection with costly outcomes, we found a large discrep-
ancy between stated barriers and formal regulatory requirements. 
Therefore, it is important not to interpret regulation as solely a barrier 
external to the organization, but rather to focus on how the organi-
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